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KEPELBAGAIAN PENGARAH SEBAGAI ANTESEDEN DAN 
TANGGUNGJAWAB SOSIAL KORPORAT SEBAGAI KESAN KEPADA 
PENGURUSAN PENDAPATAN: BUKTI DARI MALAYSIA 
ABSTRAK 
Amalan pengurusan pendapatan telah meningkat sejak kebelakangan ini. 
Kesan dari amalan ini semestinya memudaratkan, oleh itu, telah mendapat perhatian 
yang luas dari ahli akademik dan pengamal. Isu pengurusan pendapatan telah 
menjadi satu kebimbangan yang serius, terutamanya yang berkaitan dengan 
keupayaan tadbir urus korporat sebagai mekanisma pemantauan dan akibat dari 
manifestasi pengurusan pendapatan. Teori Agensi dan Teori Modal Insan digunakan 
dalam kajian ini untuk mengkaji hubungan antara kepelbagaian lembaga 
(kepelbagaian-di-lembaga dan kepelbagaian-dalam-lembaga) dengan pengurusan 
pendapatan. Kajian ini juga mengkaji tanggungjawab sosial korporat (CSR) sebagai 
kesan dari pengurusan pendapatan berdasarkan Teori Pemegang taruh-Agensi dan 
Teori Pengisyaratan. Secara khususnya, kajian ini mengkaji sama ada pengurusan 
pendapatan memberi kesan terhadap kualiti pendedahan CSR. Di samping itu, kajian 
ini meneliti kesan penyederhana reputasi korporat terhadap pengurusan pendapatan 
dan CSR. Kajian ini telah menganalisis sejumlah 265 syarikat tersenarai awam di 
Pasaran Utama Bursa Malaysia bagi tahun 2016 dan melaporkan bahawa kepimpinan 
lembaga, pelbagai jawatan lembaga pengarah, kepelbagaian jantina dan kepelbagaian 
umur adalah negatif dan signifikan berhubung dengan pengurusan pendapatan. 
Hubungan diantara komitmen pengarah bukan eksekutif dan kepelbagaian 
kewarganegaraan, sebaliknya, dilaporkan positif dan signifikan dengan pengurusan 
pendapatan. Pembolehubah yang lain iaitu saiz lembaga, kepelbagaian etnik dan 
xv 
kepelbagaian kompetensi tidak mempunyai pengaruh dalam mengurangkan 
pengurusan pendapatan. Beralih kepada kesan dari pengurusan pendapatan, hasil 
kajian melaporkan tiada perhubungan statistik dan signifikan diantara pengurusan 
pendapatan dan CSR. Malah, reputasi korporat juga tidak memberi kesan 
penyederhanaan diantara hubungan pengurusan pendapatan dan CSR. Berdasarkan 
hasil penyelidikan ini, pembuat dasar boleh menggunakan hasil kajian ini untuk 
mengiktiraf peranan penting yang dimainkan oleh beberapa sifat kepelbagaian 
lembaga dalam mengurangkan amalan tidak bermoral ini di Malaysia. Di samping 
itu, pihak berkuasa juga harus menggalakkan syarikat-syarikat untuk berusaha 
melaporkan pendedahan CSR yang lebih berkualiti, bukan kuantiti pendedahan 
semata-mata. 
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BOARD DIVERSITY AS ANTECEDENT AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AS CONSEQUENCE OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: 
MALAYSIAN EVIDENCE 
ABSTRACT 
Earnings management practices have escalated in recent years. The 
consequence of this practice is detrimental, and has received immense attention from 
academician and practitioners. The issue of earnings management has become a 
serious concern, especially in corporate governance ability as a monitoring 
mechanism and the consequence of earnings management manifestation. Using 
Agency Theory and Human Capital Theory, this research endeavours to investigate 
the relationship between board diversity (diversity-of-boards and diversity-in-boards) 
and earnings management. This research also determines to examine corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) as the consequence of earnings management based on 
Stakeholder-agency Theory and Signalling Theory. Particularly, this study 
investigates whether earnings management affects the quality of CSR disclosure. 
Additionally, this research examines the moderating effect of corporate reputation 
between earnings management and CSR. A total of 265 public listed companies on 
the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia for the year 2016 have been analysed. This study 
reveals that board leadership, multiple directorships, gender diversity and age 
diversity are significantly negative in relation to earnings management. Non-
executive directors‘ commitment and nationality diversity, on the other hand, are 
found to be significant and positively associated with earnings management. The 
remaining variables which are board size, ethnic diversity and competency diversity 
were found to have no effect in mitigating earnings management. Concentrating on 
xvii 
the consequence of earnings management, the findings reported no significant 
statistical association between earnings management and CSR. Likewise, the 
corporate reputation appears to have no effect on the moderating the relationship 
between earnings management and CSR. Based on the results of this research, 
policy-makers might use the study‘s findings to recognise the important roles played 
by several board diversity attributes in alleviating the opportunistic practices in 
Malaysia. In addition, the authority should also encourage companies to further 
address the quality of CSR disclosure, instead of solely focusing on quantity.   
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Over the past few decades, the subject of earnings quality and earnings management 
has received extensive attention due to the high-profile corporate scandals that were 
deliberately conducted by some companies in the business world. In the earlier years, 
1997 and 1998 specifically, the Asian financial crisis uncovered the causes of the 
financial crisis which are weak governance and poor governance standards 
(European Central Bank, 2016).  
Literature has presented several definitions of earnings management1. This 
current study employs the most widely used and comprehensive definitions which 
came from Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Schipper (1989) in the sense that these 
definitions refer to the management‘s intention to not report actual earnings and 
operating activities by using their own judgment in accounting choices legitimately 
or illegitimately, and with the aim to achieve some particular interests.  
Earnings management is a global occurrence and Malaysia is no exception to 
this opportunistic practice. Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2003) reported that out 
of 34 countries, Malaysia was ranked 9
th
 place for its critical earnings opacity and
used earnings management to smooth their income to plan their tax strategies 
(Kasipillai & Mahenthiran, 2013). In fact, there is a growing concern over the 
increase in misreporting cases in Malaysia. The Securities Commission in this 
country reported 17 cases of earnings manipulation from 1996 to 2012 (cited in Teh, 
Ong & Yin, 2017). In addition, a survey conducted by KPMG from January 2010 to 
1
The terms ―earnings quality‖ are used interchangeably in prior studies because higher earnings 
management represent lower earnings quality and vice versa. Thus, research on earnings quality also 
can be referenced in the earnings management study (Dechow et al., 2010; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
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December 2012, found that 27 per cent of the respondents had experienced unethical 
behaviour or misconduct in the workplace during the survey period. To be specific, 
the most common unethical behaviour was management conflict of interest which 
carried 71 per cent  (KPMG, 2013). In a more current survey, PwC revealed that the 
issue of business misconduct increased to the percentage of 45 per cent 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2018). Interestingly, this audit firm stated that corporate 
control is the least mechanism that could detect opportunistic behaviours by which 
indicated that there was insufficient focus on controls in the companies. Particularly, 
the monitoring activity is the strongest mechanism in corporate control that played its 
role in detecting misconducts. With regards to this concern, costly and onerous 
regulatory requirements especially in the internal controls and the role of boards are 
required to reinforce monitoring mechanism and many Malaysian companies seem to 
underestimate these menaces and appear uncertain in rectifying them 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2018). 
Malaysian corporate scene has also been flawed by cases of weak corporate 
governance which are closely related to earnings management. In relation to revenue 
recognition for instance, this earnings management practices has raised concern 
among property developers in Malaysia. In the year 2011, Mutiara Goodyear 
Development Bhd, a subsidiary of ATIS Corp Bhd restated their revenue due to the 
confusion in recognising the revenue, either percentage of completion or at the point 
the constructed goods delivered to the customers. As said by ATIS Corp Bhd, this 
issue is mainly due to the absence of a definitive national view on when revenue 
should be stated in the accounts of property developers (The Star, 2011). Likewise, 
Xerox Corp and Bausch and Lomb are the example of revenue recognition in 
international business environment. 
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Some of the other high-profile scandals that have shaken the Malaysia market 
sentiments were Megan Media, Transmile Group Berhad, Perwaja Steel, Malaysia 
Airlines System, Renong and Tat Sang. Ever since, in addition to the vast research on 
earnings management, corporate governance has raised discourse among researchers 
and became one of the most controversial topics in both academic and business press 
(Larcker & Tayan, 2011). The publicity and attention around those cases have 
questioned the transparency and credibility of financial reporting and corporate 
governance.  
Agency theorist stated that the separation of ownership and control leads to 
goal divergence between managers and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
which ensued to earnings management. This agency problem increases the need for 
effective monitoring and control over management to protect the interests of 
investors and stakeholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Prior literature corroborates that 
the existence of poor corporate governance may facilitate manipulation, corruption 
and mismanagement in business. Larcker and Tayan (2011) stated that effective 
monitoring and advising system done by the directors could reduce and minimise the 
managers‘ opportunistic behaviour that caused by agency conflict. Hence, this 
resulted to lower earnings management practices.  
In line with the definition of corporate governance, ‗…process and structure 
used to direct and manage the business…‘ (Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance, 2012), the most imperative internal controlling and monitoring device; 
the directors, have the power to control, monitor and provide the fittest decisions for 
the management to dissuade management from opportunistic behaviours (Baldenius, 
Melumad, & Meng, 2014; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995). Fama and Jenson 
(1983) denote board of directors as the apex of a company‘s monitoring and control 
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system whereby they have the power over the managers‘ employment, rejection or 
approval of key decisions, and provide advice and expertise on managing the 
company. Directors are expected to assert on higher reporting quality since the 
reported financial and voluntary information is a crucial source of verifiable 
information that is useful in monitoring and evaluating the managers along with their 
decisions and strategies.  
Due to the fear of recurrence of the economic meltdown like the previous 
Asian financial crisis, many countries in Asia have learnt the lesson the hard way and 
have rightfully strengthened their corporate governance mechanisms. Hence, 
Malaysia introduced Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 2000 
and the code evolves and improves overtime to further strengthen corporate 
governance practices including board of directors‘ policies. The latest revision was 
made in the year 2017. MCCG and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements have been 
actively develop the best regulatory and structures that company should abide and 
practice which include the board members‘ structural attributes.  
The effectiveness of board of directors is contingent on a myriad of factors. 
For instance, the board meeting frequency and attendance, remuneration and 
ownership could affect the board‘s effectiveness (Kamardin & Haron, 2011). Kang, 
Cheng and Gray (2007) added that board diversity could also influence the board 
effectiveness. Hafsi and Turgut (2013) consider board diversity in terms of structural 
attributes (i.e. board leadership, multiple directorships, board size and non-executive 
directors‘ commitment) and demographic attributes (i.e. gender, age, ethnic, 
competency and nationality). Due to the breadth of board diversity term, the 
researchers signify structural attributes as diversity-of-boards and demographic 
attributes as diversity-in-boards. This current study utilises such definition. 
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Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) is one of the earlier studies that 
investigated board diversity and they state that a diverse or heterogeneous group of 
directors possess different perspective, evaluate more alternatives and more careful 
in exploring the consequences of those alternatives which will result in effective 
problem-solving. Moreover, the researchers also indicate that heterogeneity members 
view issues in broader lenses, while homogeneity takes a narrow perspective. 
Therefore, a heterogeneous board of directors may augment the company 
performance. 
National governments are concerned with diversity on democratic grounds. 
Therefore, Malaysia would be an interesting avenue as it has been known to 
encourage women participation and for its diverse ethnicity. With regards to gender 
equality, the efforts to increase women directors in the boardroom have commenced 
since 2011, whereby the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Datuk Seri Najib Tun 
Razak set the goal to have 30 per cent women directors at the decision-making level 
by 2016. In the Budget 2012 speech, he stated that the government organised 
advanced management programmes for women with potential to become members of 
the board. Furthermore, the MCCG 2012 posits companies to disclose their effort in 
increasing the women directors in the annual reports commencing in 2012. Likewise, 
Malaysia also practices gender equality by integrating gender equality and women‘s 
empowerment into poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and 
recovery, and environment and sustainable environment as pledged by the United 
Nation (UNDP) Sustainable Development.  
With regards to ethnicity, Malaysian companies are operated in a markedly 
multi-racial environment. Statistically, the population is dominated by the 
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Bumiputera2
 
or Malays and is followed with Chinese and others3. This unique setting 
requires more diversity in terms of ethnic composition of the board members than 
other countries that are predominantly populated by one ethnic, for instance, the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Hong Kong. The issue of ethnic composition 
can be seen as a more contentious issue since the issuance of National Economic 
Policy (NEP)4 which stresses on the Malays and other indigenous rights on the 
country‘s economy, for instance, Malays dominate the country‘s politic and 
population while Chinese controls the business transaction. Rachagan, Marshall, 
Poon and Satkunasingam (2015) documented that albeit Malaysia is an ethnically 
diverse country, business has often been run and operated within ethnic and kinship 
groups (i.e. family owned Chinese companies). The researchers also noted that the 
appointment of Malays as the directors provide the advantage of having political 
benefits, particularly on their political connections. Moreover, the researchers 
suggested that Malaysian situation is made more complicated by the political 
environment in which there is strong policy support for Bumiputra economic 
participation and strong patronage networks. Hence, the mixture of multi-racial 
community in Malaysia delivers an exclusive research environment and setting that 
is not comparable with other countries. 
Despite the abovementioned unique characteristics, Amran et al. (2014) 
reported that Malaysia is nowhere near to its goal since the female representation of 
directors in companies is only at 8.34 per cent. In addition, Malaysia is experiencing 
ethnic homogeneity issues in the boardroom (Abdullah, Ku Ismail, & Nachum, 2016) 
                                                          
2
 Bumiputera literally mean ―the son of the soil‖. It also includes Orang Asli (the aborigines) and other 
indigenous ethnics, such as the indigenous natives from Sabah and Sarawak. 
3
 To be precise, the percentage of population as at 2010 is 67.4% for Bumiputera, 26% for Chinese, 
7% for others. Source taken from https://www.dosm.gov.my.  
4
 The NEP issued by the Malaysia government with the effort to appease the 1969 racial tensions 
(between Chinese and Malays) 
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which is probably due to the strong homophily tendencies in East Asia which include 
Malaysia itself. Moreover, Cheong and Sinnakkannu (2014) deem corporate 
Malaysia is still be divided along racial lines despite Malaysians have been 
propagating the reduction of racial boundaries. Hence, this shows that Malaysia 
companies are still averse to challenge the status quo in appointing the board 
members.  
The concern of appointing homogeneous line of directors indicates resistance 
to change the status quo and is still an on-going concern. Prior studies encourage 
higher diversity in boardroom as it brings up the company performance. For instance, 
gender diversity and ethnic diversity are able to lead to superior financial 
performance (Cheong & Sinnakkannu, 2014; Julizaerma & Sori, 2012; Lee-kuen, 
Sok-gee, & Zainudin, 2017; Marimuthu, 2008). Knowing the significant role of 
heterogeneous directors, now is the best time to promote heterogeneity in board to 
steer companies away from the tired status quo. Hence, companies are encouraged to 
enhance their boardroom with diverse board diversity attributes (Hafsi & Turgut, 
2013). 
Another strand of this study is to investigate the consequence of earnings 
management. Earnings management has been known to be the mechanism that 
negatively influenced financial performance (Ching, Teh, San, & Hoe, 2015; Gill, 
Biger, Mand, & Mathur, 2013), value relevance (Mostafa, 2017; Shan, 2015) and 
reputation (Martínez-Ferrero, Rodriguez-Ariza Manuel, & Bermejo-Sánchez, 2016; 
Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 2005). Based on these detrimental effects, companies tend 
to search for a technique and in accordance with stakeholder theory and legitimacy 
theory, prior studies reported that corporate social responsibility (CSR) could fix and 
ameliorate their affliction caused by earnings management. Zain and Janggu (2006) 
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suggest that CSR facilitates companies to achieve balanced sustainability elements 
apart from serving as an effective mechanism to satisfy the stakeholders‘ 
expectation. From the same token, CSR helps to improve a company‘s financial 
performance, image and reputation as well as competitive advantage and valuation 
(Amran & Abdul Khalid, 2009; Kahreh, Babania, Tive, & Mehdi, 2014; Saleh, 
Zulkifli, & Muhamad, 2010). As a result, CSR can be used as a means of improving 
the affected companies. 
Building upon these advantages of CSR, Malaysia encourages companies to 
be more socially responsible by issuing several incentives. In the year 2010, Bursa 
Malaysia launched a comprehensive framework for the public listed companies 
(PLCs) as guide for sustainability reporting. Since Bursa Malaysia has always been 
the advocate for sustainability, it has recently developed a Sustainability Reporting 
Guide for assisting the PLCs to improve their sustainability-related reporting that 
meet the needs of various stakeholders. Since then, numerous efforts by the 
regulators have been established to encourage more CSR engagement by Malaysian 
companies. However, CSR in Malaysia is still infancy and relatively in development 
despite being part of the government agenda. Likewise, in terms of reporting, Sadou 
et al. (2017) reported that the extent and quality of CSR disclosure fails to achieve a 
high level of quality. 
Unfortunately, in recent time, CSR has been used in multiple formations 
albeit its benefits. Contradicting prior findings that showed positive effects of CSR, it 
was revealed that CSR can also be used opportunistically; for instance, as a green 
washing tool whereby the management provides a positive impression of their 
overall environmental performance with the intention of misleading the stakeholders 
from their actual operations that are opposite to the announced initiatives (Bowen & 
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Aragon-Correa, 2014). For instance, palm oil businesses in Malaysia received 
unequivocal allegations regarding their extension of palm oil plantation. Some of the 
allegations are affecting the survival of the animal and plant species, pollutions, 
practicing child labour and forced labour and other adverse effects. Hence, palm oil 
businesses are in high inclination to improve their environmental disclosure (Othman 
& Ameer, 2010).  
Ultimately, there are still some other egregious CSR motivations where the 
focus of this study is to scrutinise CSR as the consequence of earnings management, 
by which the management is committed to practicing CSR by misusing it to reinforce 
the entrenchment strategy (Cespa & Cestone, 2007; Martinez-Ferrero, Rodriguez-
Ariza, & Garcia-Sanchez, 2016; Prior, Surroca, & Tribó, 2008; Surroca & Tribo, 
2008). This strategic approach is proven to be misused by irrational managers in 
developed countries and the notion behind this approach is that this opportunistic 
motivation is deliberately conducted by irrational managers to mislead stakeholders 
from detecting their opportunistic managerial discretion and gain the stakeholders‘ 
support (Cespa & Cestone, 2007; Choi, Lee, & Park, 2013; Prior et al., 2008). This 
issue of misusing CSR is less likely to be investigated in developing countries which 
motivate this study to delve into.   
Following to the relationship between earnings management and CSR, this 
study would like to introduce a moderating variable that is believed to be able to 
moderate the respective relationship. Corporate reputation has been chosen as the 
moderator with the notion of strengthening the relationship between earnings 
management and CSR due to the pressure of sustaining and protecting the present 
reputation of the reputable companies.   
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Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) highlight that most of empirical studies 
examined earnings management subject on either its antecedents (similar to 
determinants and causes) or consequences (similar to outcomes) of earnings quality. 
The researchers regarded earnings quality and earnings management as the two sides 
of the same coin with the rationalization of earnings management erodes earnings 
quality. Additionally, they encourage future academician and researcher to execute a 
complete path research by which a study that examines both sides, particularly the 
antecedents and consequence of earnings quality. This type of research offers deeper 
and holistic insights that are unavailable on a partial research. Building on this 
proposal, this current research leverages and responds the researchers‘ suggestions. 
Therefore, board diversity serves as the antecedent of earnings management and CSR 
as the consequence of earnings management.    
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Issues in corporate governance have been the interest of many researchers from 
various disciplines since many years (Al-Dhamari & Ku Ismail, 2014; Amran, Lee, 
& Devi, 2014; Carter et al., 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Xie, 
Davidson, & Dadalt, 2003). This interest is due to various issues that persist which 
require continuous effort to find the best formula for better governance. One of the 
issues that require strong governance is earnings management. Further, earnings 
management has been accepted to be included as part of various untruthful actions. 
As discussed in previous sections, few cases of earnings management in Malaysia 
give the sense of urgency in conducting this research. Hosseini, Chalestori, Hi, & 
Ebrahimi (2016) concede by indicating that conducting this kind of research on 
earnings management could provide a higher quality of understanding for the capital 
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market participants and insider‘s decision making process (i.e. shareholders, 
investors, regulators, social and environmental activists and consumers).  
Earnings quality is expected to be improved across time due to the 
introduction of several initiatives affiliated to corporate governance. In respect to 
earnings management, the effectiveness of corporate governance especially on board 
of directors is still being questioned as reported earning is still reported to be low in 
quality (indicated higher earnings management) (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015; 
Mohamad, Rashid, & Shawtari, 2012; Wan Mohammad, Wasiuzzaman, & Nik 
Salleh, 2016) due to the incapacity of the directors in constraining earnings 
management. Besides, investors continue to have reservations and are less confidents 
in regards to the boards‘ ability to enhance the quality of earnings  although efforts 
have been made by the Malaysian regulators to reform corporate governance 
following the Asian financial crisis (Al-Dhamari & Ku Ismail, 2014). The 
researchers further explained that investors rely on information of the directors to 
assess the reported earnings but unfortunately the research found that the directors 
failed to do so. The findings indicate a need to revisit the revised corporate 
governance regulation in the near future to restore investors‘ confidence regarding 
reported earnings. Hence, this study attempts to renew the interest on corporate 
governance mechanism, specifically into leveraging the advantage of board diversity 
in addressing the governance issue of which represented by earnings management.  
Stimulated with the approach of board diversity by Hafsi and Turgut (2013), 
this study implies board diversity in two dimensions. On one hand, structural board 
diversity attributes (namely board leadership, multiple directorships, board size and 
non-executive directors‘ commitment) as diversity-of-boards, while on the other 
hand, demographic board diversity attributes (namely gender, age, ethnic, 
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competency and nationality) as diversity-in-boards. As the nature of both diversity-
of-boards and diversity-in-boards are intertwined and tested in a study, a 
comprehensive and holistic discussion and insights on board‘s efficiency and 
effectiveness can be acquired.  
The effectiveness of the board has raised discourse in several parties and thus, 
this study would like to prove as to whether this controlling mechanism could serve 
its duties. Agency theorists (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
suggest that structural attributes or diversity-of-boards can be used to establish 
superior monitoring and control mechanism that minimise agency cost and may 
affect earnings management. It is also reported that diversity-in-boards (specifically 
demographic board diversity) can be an instrument to enhance its overall problem-
solving capacity (Becker, 1964) and enhance the extent of moral or ethical 
development of a company (Labelle, Gargouri, & Francoeur, 2010). The 
effectiveness of board requires diversity of knowledge, competencies, work 
experience and functional background. As such, those values are often included in 
the board of directors selection process (Miller & Triana, 2009). Justified from the 
diversity advantages, this study aims to provide empirical evidence as to whether 
diversified or heterogeneous boards have a significant effect on earning management. 
The research into earnings management has usually involved the 
identification of its determinants, controlling mechanism and the environmental 
conditions that influence its occurrence, which also known as the antecedent 
variables. Hence, this study selected board diversity as the antecedent of earnings 
management due to its ability in influencing the occurrence of earnings management. 
Known as the corporate governance mechanism that supposedly alleviates earnings 
management, it is practical to select board diversity and investigate whether it can 
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effectively mitigate earnings management, be the cause of the occurrence or may be 
no response. Following to that, due to the occurrence of earnings management, it 
could also leads to CSR. Being the variable for the consequence of earnings 
management, this study would like to ratify in Malaysian context whether the 
increment of CSR was due to earnings management. 
Traditionally, prior studies reported that CSR has been known to be 
beneficial for companies (improved performance and reputation). Therefore, 
companies are contending with each other to appear as socially responsible 
companies. However, academic research has also burgeoned with the issue of misuse 
of CSR against earnings management that serves as the managerial entrenchment. In 
relation to the underlying agency problem in earnings management, irrational 
managers may opt for overinvestment and increase the financial resources allocated 
to social and environmental concessions, namely, CSR as a hedging strategy against 
any disciplinary initiatives (Prior et al., 2008; Surroca & Tribo, 2008) and 
unfavourable media coverage.  
Cespa and Cestone (2007) firstly denote that managers resort to more CSR 
engagements as this way may satisfy their stakeholders‘ demand and expectation 
which could appease the negative reactions to the perceived earnings management 
that resulted from the agency conflict of interest. CSR can be promoted as a means of 
building trust and cooperative relationships with stakeholders whom manage and 
control key resources that hold the longevity of a company (Prior et al., 2008), allow 
managers to reinforce their job security (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989) and protect from 
costly media boycotts and stakeholders activism since the stakeholders‘ demand have 
been satisfied with social and environmental concessions (Cespa & Cestone, 2007). 
Other than the issue of abusing CSR, practicing managerial entrenchment is also 
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deemed to be harmful to the shareholders since the incumbent managers expropriated 
shareholders‘ power and control and transferred it to them. Hence, managerial 
entrenchment remains as another agency cost arising from the earlier agency conflict 
aroused between the managers and shareholders. 
The association between earnings management and CSR has been studied 
mostly in the developed countries and the results are inconclusive. Previous studies 
reported that the positive relationship occurred when earnings management misused 
CSR as entrenchment mechanism and negative relationship occurred when 
companies practices or reports high CSR were less likely to involve in earnings 
management. Some of other underlying factors that also caused mixed results are the 
different business environment between developed countries and developing 
countries and also the different measurement for earnings management and CSR. 
Other than the Modified Jones model, prior studies used several other measurements 
for discretionary accruals, which is the proxy for earnings management. Dissimilar 
from previous studies, this study uses quality of CSR disclosure to capture the level 
of CSR in Malaysia which offers a more detailed measure. Nonetheless, this study 
expects other plausible variable that could explain the mixed results. Therefore, this 
study invests to examine a potential moderating variable; which is corporate 
reputation.  
Companies can be either good reputation company or bad reputation 
company. According to Schwartz (2008), a good reputation company means it is 
profitable and fit for doing business, always strive to meet the aspirations of its many 
stakeholders, doing business with high integrity, honest, ethical, uncompromising 
about values and principal and always in tune with society. Likewise, Othman, Darus 
and Arshad (2011), a good reputation company is when it has done good community 
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services or has obtained several recognition and certification on its products and 
services. In addition, socially reputed companies are referred to those companies that 
received award or certification in various category related to CSR (Kansal, Joshi, & 
Batra, 2014). On the other hand, bad reputation company can be classified as 
company that involved with controversial industry that produce products and 
services harmful to human being, society and environment (Cai, Hoje, & Carrie, 
2012). Knowing the importance of corporate reputation, both poor and good 
reputable companies practice numerous CSR activities as it is deemed to be an 
important device to fix poor reputation (Guillamón-Saorín et al., 2017) and sustain 
good reputation (Kansal et al., 2014).  
However, reputable companies, primarily, are much more obligated to be 
socially responsible as they receive more scrutiny from the stakeholders and even the 
public. It is also proven that those socially reputed companies are more prone to 
invest their CSR budget and report higher CSR disclosure to maintain and enhance 
their good reputation (Kansal et al., 2014). This is because those reputable companies 
are in the spotlight of multiple stakeholders, far more visible and most likely to be 
noticed when they did something controversial (earnings management as an 
example) or other misconduct. Besides, all news media and public are watching them 
and they tend to receive stricter treatment by the public. Fear that earnings 
management could destroy their reputation (Martinez-Ferrero et al., 2016), these 
companies shall increase their CSR to safeguard their reputation due to the harmful 
effect of earnings management. On this basis, corporate reputation can be a factor of 
moderation by strengthening the relationship between earnings management and 
CSR.  
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In summing up, studies in earnings management realm showcase equal 
distribution of importance in terms of its antecedent and consequences. This is 
because numerous studies have been diligently scrutinising both sides, either 
separately or simultaneously since many years ago. Hence, by incorporating both 
sides in one study can exhibits comprehensive coverage of knowledge. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
This study investigates the antecedent and consequence of earnings management by 
addressing the following questions: 
1.  Do the attributes of diversity-of-boards (board leadership, multiple directorships, 
board size and non-executive directors commitment) affect earnings 
management? 
2. Do the attributes of diversity-in-boards (gender, age, ethnicity, nationality and 
competency) influence earnings management? 
3. Is earnings management associated with CSR? 
4. Does corporate reputation moderate the relationship between earnings 
management and CSR? 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
This study has four research objectives. The objectives are as follows: 
1. To determine whether diversity-of-boards attributes (board leadership, multiple 
directorships, board size and non-executive directors commitment) affect 
earnings management. 
2. To examine whether diversity-in-boards attributes (gender, age, ethnicity, 
nationality and competency) influence earnings management. 
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3. To investigate the association between earnings management and CSR. 
4. To determine whether corporates reputation has a moderating effect on the 
relationship between earnings management and CSR. 
 
1.5 Malaysian Institutional Setting 
Malaysia is an appropriate and interesting setting to explore the antecedents and 
consequence of earnings management. In this section, an overview of Malaysian 
institutional setting is firstly introduced. 
The Malaysian business environment, especially trading and commerce, 
originally followed the Great Britain economic system. This country was originally 
known as Malaya and gained its independence in the year 1957. Immediately after its 
independence, Malaysia boarded on a plan of rapid industrialisation and formulated 
its first Industrialisation Strategy in the 1970s. The diversification and 
industrialisation of the country‘s economy were the main focus of this strategy 
(Siddiquee, 2006).  
Upon setting the government policy agenda in Malaysia, social 
considerations have played a significant role. The Malaysian population consists of 
two main groups known as Bumiputera and non Bumiputera. The indigenous people, 
the Malay, are called the Bumiputera whilst the others are known as the non 
Bumiputera. Malaysia is highly diversified in terms of ethnicity whereby it also 
comprises of three main ethnic groups which are the Malay, Chinese and Indian. 
These multiracial attributes provide multiple inherent economic backgrounds and 
cultures that impacted the business environment and operation. 
Malaysia is known as a country with multicultural country with diverse 
ethnicity that practices different cultural values and religious beliefs. Historically, 
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three main ethnic groups were involved in different levels of economy back then. 
Traditional agricultural sector ran by the Malays were considered irrelevant to foster 
in the British colonial economy which hindered the Malays to grow economically 
(Williams, 2007). Instead, the British opted to use cheap labours from China and 
India to uphold more profitable exports industries. 
Aspired to alleviate the poor judgment of economy stability with regards to 
race capability, the Malaysian government enforced a policy named the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) from the year 1970 until 1990 and the National 
Development Policy (NDP) from 1991 to 2000. The NEP can be seen as a form of 
government involvement in answering the 1969 ethnic rampaging with the intention 
of eliminating the identification of race using economic functions (Johnson & 
Mitton, 2003). This effort has promoted a 30% increase in the Bumiputera ownership 
of the corporate sector by the year 1990. Since then, the Bumiputera have been given 
priority for various businesses including several subsidies, business deals and capital 
access (Johnson & Mitton, 2003). The effectiveness of these policies led to the 
increase in the corporate sector that is positively linked to business and politics in 
Malaysia (Economic Planning Unit, 2017). The Malaysian government then 
introduced the NDP but is unfortunately still deemed as a pro-Malay policy, or what 
Torii (1997) calls ―ethnicity-oriented‖ despite the differences in priorities and 
strategy between these two policy instruments.  
Tracing the history of the Malaysian economy, it is essential to indicate that 
having a multi-racial environment has affected the economy and this issue is still 
being discussed until today. The next section converses the significant attributes that 
designated Malaysia as the most appropriate avenue to use in this study.  
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1.5.1 Diversity in Malaysia Boardroom 
The inclusion of women and ethnic minorities on corporate boards is an emerging 
issue in corporate governance. Other than Malaysia, several countries (such as 
Belgium, Brazil, Italy and others) have introduced or in the process of forming a 
requirement with regards to mandatory gender quota in the boardroom (Gyapong, 
Monem, & Hu, 2016). With regards to some encouragements carried by the Malaysia 
government in promoting diversity in the board of director members, the two 
minority demographic attributes are reviewed. Other than their substantial influence 
on Malaysia, these two demographic attributes are believed to be important for 
promoting diversity in the boardroom as they are included in the letter dated 22 July 
2014 (―Letter‖) promulgated by Bursa Malaysia Berhad, clarified that PLCs is 
required to disclose its board of directors and workforce diversity policy in terms of 
gender, age and ethnicity in the annual reports that issued on or after 2 January 2015 
as part of the enhanced disclosure requirements to Paragraph 15.08A of the Main 
Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad. This serves to 
complement the various initiatives launched to inculcate diversity in the boardroom 
and workplace. 
 
1.5.1(a)  Gender Diversity  
The poor representation of women in board indicates a major issue in Malaysia. The 
Woman, Family and Social Development Department (MWFSD) reported that in 
2010, women constituted almost half of the population in Malaysia and made up 47.3 
per cent of the workforce. Following to that, the government optimisms to increase 
the percentage to 55 per cent (The Star, 2011b). In promoting women‘s role and 
participation on board, the government has regulated a policy that the board must 
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comprise at least 30 per cent of females in decision-making positions and listed 
companies had until 2016 to adhere such policy (The Star, 2011a). In a recent study, 
Amran et al. (2014) found that 8.34 per cent of the total seats of the board were 
occupied by female directors which is only a mere 1 per cent increase from the 2008 
study, 7.7 per cent. This can indicate that Malaysian companies still have a long way 
to fulfil the 30 per cent board seats allocated for women. Hence, this study may 
provide some empirical evidence that shows a more diverse board in terms of gender 
diversity can improve the effectiveness of governance. 
 
1.5.1(b)  Ethnic Diversity  
Ethnic diversity has been found to influence Malaysian economic and corporate 
governance (Abdullah & Ku Ismail, 2013; Ayoib & Nosakhare, 2015; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005). In Malaysia, the Department of Statistics reveals that the current 
population estimation from 2014 to 2016 comprises predominantly of Malays, 
Chinese and Indian. Referring to the business environment, the Malays dominate the 
country‘s politic and population, while the Chinese controls Malaysia‘s business 
transaction. In addition to the NEP and NDP, Bursa Malaysia has legislated that 
Bumiputera should hold 30 per cent equity ownership in any listed company. This 
continuous formulation is to strengthen the cultivation of Bumiputera participation 
(Marimuthu, 2010). However, as of 30
th
 June 2015, Bumiputera-controlled PLCs 
accounted for only 17.4 per cent of market capitalisation on Bursa Malaysia. The 
formulation effectively increases the Bumiputera equity holding in the capital market 
(specifically rose 31 per cent from the year 2014) despite of the low percentage (The 
Star, 2015). 
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 Rachagan et al. (2015) documented that the appointment of Malays as the 
directors provide political benefits that are consistent with policies targeted at 
increasing the level of importance of the Malays in business environment. Yet, the 
researchers suggested that this diversity is underutilised. A low ethnic diversification 
in board may not exhibit a culture of open-mindedness that hinders knowledge 
creation since directors with different ethnic backgrounds could contribute their 
knowledge and understanding especially to companies that are dispersed in different 
regions worldwide. Hence, this study is crucial to provide a stand for the policy-
makers and regulators to enhance and improve ethnic diversity among board 
members.   
Gender and ethnic diversity are the two elements that are substantial for 
Malaysia as the regulators have been putting much effort in promoting gender 
diversity as Malaysia is known as a multi-racial country. Build upon the above 
discussion, Malaysia can be a unique platform that substantial for this study‘s 
contribution in knowledge. Hence, this study conforms to Malaysia institutional 
setting by which encouraging and searching for better and superior corporate 
governance mechanism along with asserting companies to truthfully contribute to the 
society and environment. 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge in earnings management by 
providing new awareness on board diversity attributes roles as the antecedents and 
CSR as the consequence of earning management in a developing country.  
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1.6.1 Theoretical Contributions 
Most prior studies focus on specific attributes concerning board diversity, either the 
demographic or structural attributes of the directors despite of apparent widespread 
support for board diversity. In response, this study examines both dimensions, by 
separating the nature of the diversity, namely, diversity-of-boards (board leadership, 
multiple directorships, board size and non-executive directors commitment) and 
diversity-in-boards (gender, age, ethnicity, competency and nationality). Moreover, 
this study extends the findings of prior studies by not only incorporating the most 
common theory which is agency theory to scrutinise the association of board 
diversity and earnings management. Human capital theory is also incorporated to 
fortify the former theory.  
Furthermore, this study may add another view to the literature by explaining 
the issue of managers using CSR as the entrenchment strategy using stakeholder-
agency theory and signalling theory. This misuse of CSR realm is still limited 
especially in developing countries. Thus, this study fills the gap in the Malaysia 
literature. 
Corporate reputation is also incorporated as the moderating variable in this 
study. This is done mainly due to its ability to affect the relationship between 
earnings management and CSR by which CSR will be practiced and engaged more 
aggressively by the irrational managers to safeguard their position and the 
companies‘ reputation. Hence, in accordance to legitimacy theory, corporate 
reputation is believed to could moderate the respective relationship. 
Lastly, this study will serve as a study that takes into account both the 
antecedent and consequence of earnings management whereby it entails the 
corporate governance effects on earnings management and earnings management 
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effects on CSR. This type of research is still limited as stated by Dechow et al. 
(2010).  
 
1.6.2 Practical Contributions 
The outcomes of this study on board diversity are valuable for the regulators and 
accounting standard-setting bodies in drawing superior policies for the board of 
directors as Malaysia has been working towards the attainment of an enriched 
corporate governance practice through effective board governance. The requirements 
for the board of directors‘ selection and corporate governance are still loose. Apart 
from the directors‘ monitoring role, this study offers empirical evidence and aims to 
promote a heterogeneous line of board members that possesses diverse attributes 
which appear to be significant in today‘s business environment. This study 
specifically intents to validate that diversity-of-boards and diversity-in-boards as it 
may improve the governance among Malaysian companies. 
Moreover, the empirical findings of this study may shed light for the 
investors, analysts and researchers to better understand how the board of directors‘ 
diversity affects earnings management and how CSR is being exploited by irrational 
managers. 
This study is also substantial for the investors to also pay much attention to 
socially responsible companies as they also have the possibility of not providing 
transparent reporting. Policymakers only seem to encourage companies to engage 
and report more CSR activities instead of motivating the desired behaviour and 
reporting quality disclosure which could provide more incentives for the managers to 
utilise CSR for opportunistic actions or as an entrenchment mechanism. 
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1.6.3 Methodological Contribution 
This current study classifies board diversity in two terms which are diversity-of-
boards and diversity in-boards. While the former will be measured using binary and 
ratio scale data as most prior studies employed, the latter will be measured using 
Blau‘s Index of diversity. The rationalisations for using Blau‘s Index of diversity are 
that it has been suggested as an optimal measure of diversity to capture variance 
within a group of people and a suitable measure of diversity for categorical variables. 
Therefore, this measurement meets the criteria of this study that contain categorical 
variables in the interest of examining the impact of board heterogeneity on earnings 
management which differ from prior studies, especially in Malaysia that have only 
looked into the ratio, percentage or proportion of a variable. 
  
1.7 Scope of the Study 
The study concentrates on the issue of earnings management occurring in Malaysia 
PLCs by examining its antecedent and consequence. Therefore, this study considers 
board diversity as the antecedent (specifically as the corporate governance 
mechanism) that could have a bearing on earnings management, while also 
considering the function of CSR to conceal earnings management practices. Malaysia 
is chosen as the country of the study because of its lower earnings quality caused by 
board of directors‘ incapacity that led to investors‘ reservations and the on-going 
improvements made by the regulators in enhancing corporate reporting 
environments. Moreover, the issue of CSR being the consequence of earnings 
management has been receiving immense attention by the developed countries. Since 
the two elements which are the earnings management and CSR are commonly 
carried out by companies in Malaysia, CSR being misused against earnings 
